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Taming Madison’s Monster:
How to Fix Self-Execution Doctrine
David Sloss
Draft, August 2015
Introduction
In the Federalist Papers, James Madison invited readers to consider the hypothetical case
of a federal Constitution that provided for the supremacy of state law over federal law. In that
case, he said, “the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government founded on
an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would have seen the authority of
the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a
monster, in which the head was under the direction of the members.” 1 The modern doctrine of
non-self-executing treaties (NSE doctrine) illustrates the problems posed by Madison’s
hypothetical monster.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas is an example. 2 The United States has
a treaty obligation under Article 94 of the UN Charter “to comply with the decision of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in any case to which it is a party.” 3 When President Truman
ratified the Charter in 1945, after the Senate voted 89-2 in favor of ratification, the United States
made a binding commitment to comply with ICJ decisions. Since the Charter was ratified,
neither Congress nor any President has repudiated that commitment. At issue in Medellín was the
ICJ decision in the “Avena case,” where the ICJ ordered the U.S. to provide judicial hearings for
51 Mexican nationals on death row in the United States. 4 Medellín was one of the named
Mexican nationals; he was on death row in Texas. President Bush directed State courts to “give
effect to the [Avena] decision . . . in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that
decision.” 5 However, Texas defied the President’s order and the U.S. Supreme Court allowed
Texas to do so. The Court based its decision on the distinction between “self-executing” and
“non-self-executing” treaties. As a result of Medellín, the United States stands in ongoing
violation of a legally binding treaty commitment, but no national political authority ever decided
to violate the treaty. Thanks to Medellín, and to the transformation of NSE doctrine after World
War II, 6 Madison’s monster has come to life. The head is under the direction of the members.
On the other hand, perhaps the head retains control. Even after Medellín, Congress could
enact legislation requiring Texas and other states to comply with the Avena decision, or with ICJ
decisions generally. Several bills to that effect have been proposed, but Congress has not enacted
such legislation. 7 Recently, Congress has been so deeply divided that it is difficult to pass any
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Federalist 44 (James Madison).
552 U.S. 491 (2008)
3
UN Charter, art. 94.
4
Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31).
5
Medellin, 552 U.S., at 503.
6
See infra notes __ and accompanying text (discussing the transformation of NSE doctrine after World War II).
7
See Steve Charnovitz, Correcting America’s Continuing Failure to Comply with the Avena Judgment, 106 Am. J.
Int’l L. 572, 576-79 (2012) (discussing bills introduced in Congress).
2
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new federal legislation. Therefore, given congressional inertia, the real choice for the Court in
Medellín was whether to place the weight of congressional inertia on the side of compliance or
non-compliance. By holding that Article 94 is not self-executing, the Court chose noncompliance, but NSE doctrine did not require that choice. The Court could have chosen
compliance by holding that Article 94 is self-executing and binding on Texas. In that scenario,
also, Congress could have passed legislation to override the Court’s decision. Therefore, NSE
doctrine is consistent with federal political control, at least in theory.
The key words in the previous sentence are the words “in theory.” To confront Madison’s
monster, we must move from theory to practice. In practice, judicial application of NSE doctrine
is almost entirely arbitrary. Courts decide whether a treaty is self-executing by invoking the
“intent of the treaty makers.” 8 In the vast majority of cases, that “intent” is purely fictitious; it is
a judicial fabrication. If a court finds that the treaty makers intended the treaty to be selfexecuting, it places congressional inertia on the side of compliance. But if the court finds that the
treaty makers intended the treaty to be non-self-executing, it places congressional inertia on the
side of non-compliance. Since the courts do not want to admit that they are making decisions
about treaty compliance, they hide behind a fictitious “intent of the treaty makers” to evade
responsibility for their decisions. Insofar as state courts engage in this behavior, Madison’s
monster is real. However, federal court decisions applying the fictitious intent test are more
numerous than state court decisions. Therefore, in practice, the main problem involves a transfer
of power over treaty compliance decisions from the federal political branches to federal courts.
Since federal courts are not politically accountable, decisions about whether to comply with
national treaty obligations are being made by government actors who lack political
accountability. Treaty violations by state and local government officers are largely a
consequence of federal court decisions applying a fictitious intent test to justify a holding that a
treaty is not self-executing.
This article analyzes the development and application of the fictitious intent test that is
the cornerstone of modern NSE doctrine; I focus on the practical implications of the fictitious
intent test for the supremacy of treaties over state law. The analysis is divided into four parts.
Part One distinguishes among three distinct concepts of self-execution. Part Two summarizes the
historical evolution of self-execution doctrine. Part Three presents a detailed analysis of the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Medellín; it demonstrates that the Court applied a fictitious intent
test in Medellín. Moreover, the Court’s decision effectively authorized state government officers
to breach U.S. treaty obligations, even though the federal political branches never approved such
violations. Part Four presents recommendations for the political branches and the courts. The
recommendations are designed to ensure that, in matters related to treaty implementation, the
head retains control of the members—not just in theory, but also in practice.

8

See Medellín, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (treaties “are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be self-executing”); Restatement (Third), §
111(4) (an international agreement is non-self-executing “if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not
become effective as domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation”).
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I.
Three Concepts of Self-Execution
Courts and commentators agree that an NSE treaty requires implementing legislation.
However, for what purpose is legislation needed? Existing doctrine provides three different
answers to that question. Those three answers correspond to the “congressional-executive”
concept, the “federal-state” concept, and the “political-judicial” concept of self-execution.
Under the political-judicial concept, self-executing treaty provisions are judicially
enforceable, but courts may not directly apply NSE treaty provisions unless Congress enacts
implementing legislation. 9 Under this concept, unlike the congressional-executive concept,
federal executive officers are empowered to implement both SE and NSE treaty provisions, and
need not await legislative authorization to do so. The Supreme Court applied the politicaljudicial concept in The Head Money Cases, 10 without using the term “self-executing.” There, the
Court said that “the judicial courts have nothing to do [with NSE treaties] and can give no
redress.” However, SE treaties “are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the
courts of the country.” 11
The American Law Institute (ALI) is preparing a Fourth Restatement on U.S. foreign
relations law. The recent Discussion Draft defines self-execution in terms of the political-judicial
concept. It says: “The essential inquiry for self-execution . . . is whether a treaty provision is
directly enforceable by the courts. . . . [A]lthough it is often noted that a non-self-executing
treaty provision requires implementing legislation . . . that is not inherent in the nature of nonself-execution.” 12 The Reporters’ choice to define self-execution in terms of judicial
enforcement, instead of the need for implementing legislation, is at odds with the weight of
authority on the subject. 13 In essence, the Reporters have adopted the political-judicial concept as
THE definition of self-execution. In doing so, they disregard a large body of evidence—
summarized in this article—showing that the courts and the political branches also apply the
congressional-executive concept and the federal state concept.
Under the “federal-state” concept, an SE treaty automatically supersedes conflicting state
laws; no legislation is necessary to give the treaty preemptive effect. Conversely, an NSE treaty
does not automatically supersede conflicting state laws because federal legislation is necessary to
implement the treaty. The California Supreme Court applied the federal-state concept in Fujii v.
State, where it held that a treaty “does not automatically supersede local laws which are
inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are self-executing.” 14 The Restatement (Second)

9

The doctrine does not preclude indirect application by, for example, consulting a treaty as an aid to statutory
interpretation.
10
112 U.S. 580 (1884).
11
Id., at 598-99.
12
Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law, Treaties (Discussion Draft, April 28, 2015) § 106 cmt. b
[hereinafter, Discussion Draft].
13
Accord, Carlos M. Vazquez, Four Problems with the Draft Restatement’s Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution,
[this volume].
14
242 P.2d 617, 620 (CA 1952).
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of Foreign Relations Law also endorsed the federal-state concept. 15 Part Two shows that the
federal-state concept arose after World War II in the context of heated political debates about the
“Bricker Amendment” and judicial application of the UN Charter’s human rights provisions.
Under the “congressional-executive” concept, congressional legislation is necessary to
authorize federal executive action pursuant to an NSE treaty. 16 Conversely, the President has the
authority to implement an SE treaty, and need not await implementing legislation to do so. The
Supreme Court applied the congressional-executive concept in Cook v. United States, where it
said: “For in a strict sense the Treaty was self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary to
authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions.” 17 Parts One and Two demonstrate that the
congressional-executive concept has been the dominant concept of self-execution for most of
U.S. history.
A. Three Conceps in Medellín
In Medellin v. Texas, 18 Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion applied all three concepts
interchangeably, without acknowledging the differences among them. In part II of the opinion,
the Court vacillated between the federal-state concept and the political-judicial concept. For
example, Roberts said that Article 94 and Avena “does not of its own force constitute binding
federal law that pre-empts [contrary] state” law. 19 In this passage, the Court seemingly applied
the federal-state concept. Elsewhere, though, the Court seemingly applied the political-judicial
concept. For example, Roberts wrote that “[t]he pertinent international agreements . . . do not
provide for implementation of ICJ judgments through direct enforcement in domestic courts.”20
This passage emphasized the limitations on the judiciary’s power to enforce treaties, in
accordance with the political-judicial concept.
In part III of its opinion, the Court rejected the U.S. government’s argument that the
President’s memorandum required Texas courts to grant Medellín a judicial hearing. 21 The Court
said: “A non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one that was ratified with the understanding
that it is not to have domestic effect of its own force.” 22 Since an NSE treaty is not domestic law,
“[t]he responsibility for transforming an international obligation arising from a non-selfexecuting treaty into domestic law falls to Congress.” 23 The conclusion that congressional action
is necessary follows from “the fundamental constitutional principle that the power to make the
15

See Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, § 141 (stating that an NSE treaty
does not “supersede inconsistent provisions . . . of the law of the several states”).
16
Under this concept, legislation may also be necessary to impose domestic legal duties on federal executive
officers. Power-constraining treaty provisions impose duties on the executive branch if they are self-executing,
whereas power-enhancing provisions augment federal executive authority if they are self-executing.
17
288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933).
18
552 U.S. 491 (2008).
19
Id. at 522-23.
20
Id. at 513.
21
The President’s “directive” to state courts was included in a memorandum from President Bush to the Attorney
General, referred to as “the President’s memorandum.” See id., at 503.
22
Id., at 527.
23
Id., at 525-26.
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necessary laws is in Congress; the power to execute in the President.” 24 In the Court’s view, the
President’s memorandum could not be justified as a valid exercise of the President’s power to
execute the law because Article 94 of the UN Charter is not domestic law. 25 Therefore, the
President’s memorandum was an invalid attempt “to enforce a non-self-executing treaty by
unilaterally creating domestic law.” 26 In sum, Part III of the Court’s opinion clearly applies the
congressional-executive concept of self-execution.
The political-judicial concept cannot explain part III because, under the political-judicial
concept, an NSE treaty is law for the executive branch. However, the core rationale in part III
hinges on the assumption that an NSE treaty is not law for the executive branch—i.e., it does not
authorize the President to take action that would be unauthorized, absent the treaty. Without that
assumption, the rationale of part III simply evaporates. Granted, the Court said in Medellín that
“[t]he President may comply with the treaty’s obligations by some other means,” but not “by
unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts.” 27 That statement, though, is merely a
throw-away line. The ICJ decision required the United States to provide a judicial hearing for
Medellín. 28 Courts are the only institutions in the United States capable of providing a judicial
hearing. Therefore, if the President could not make the ICJ decision binding on domestic courts,
he could not “comply with the treaty’s obligations by some other means.” To put it bluntly, the
only way to comply with an obligation to provide a judicial hearing is to provide a judicial
hearing. The Court was surely aware of this fact when it pronounced, rather disingenuously, that
the President could comply with the Avena judgment by some other means.
B. Three Concepts in Senate Treaty Practice
In September 2008, in an unprecedented burst of treaty activity, the Senate consented to
78 treaties in four days. 29 The Senate’s unusual flurry of activity was a response to the Court’s
March 2008 decision in Medellín. Senate treaty actions in September 2008 provide the best
evidence of the treaty makers’ understanding of the terms “self-executing” and “non-selfexecuting.”
For seven of the 78 treaties, the Senate adopted declarations specifying that the treaty is
“not self-executing” (NSE declarations). 30 For 69 other treaties, it adopted declarations
24

Id., at 526.
See id., at 532 (stating that the President’s constitutional authority under the Take Care Clause “allows the
President to execute the laws, not make them”).
26
Id., at 527.
27
Id., at 530.
28
See Avena judgment, supra note __, ¶¶ 128-41, 153.
29
See 154 Cong. Rec. 20166-20174; 154 Cong. Rec. 21775-21778; 154 Cong Rec. 22464-22465.
30
See 1992 Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations, S. Treaty Doc. 107-17 (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong.
Rec. 20170-71); 1995 Revision of the Radio Regulations, S. Treaty Doc. 108-28 (resolution of ratification at 154
Cong. Rec. 20171); Land-Based Sources Protocol to the Cartagena Convention, S. Treaty Doc. 110-1 (resolution of
ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21776); 1998 Amendments to the Constitution and the Convention of the International
Telecommunication Union, S. Treaty Doc. 108-5 (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21778); 2002
Amendments to the Constitution and the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, S. Treaty Doc.
109-11 (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21778); 2006 Amendments to the Constitution and the
Convention of the International Telecommunication Union, S. Treaty Doc. 110-16 (resolution of ratification at 154
25
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specifying that the treaty is either wholly or partially self-executing. 31 The Senate did not
specifically define the term “self-executing” or “non-self-executing.” However, Senate
resolutions for eight treaties (the “eight key treaties”) shed light on its apparent understanding of
those terms. For three of the eight treaties, the Senate adopted declarations substantially
equivalent to the following: “This Protocol is self-executing. This Protocol does not confer
private rights enforceable in United States courts.” 32 For the other five treaties, the Senate
declarations specified that the treaty was partially SE and partially NSE. Those declarations
included language substantially equivalent to the following: “None of the provisions in the
Convention . . . confer private rights enforceable in United States courts.” 33
The Senate clearly did not conceive of self-execution in terms of the federal-state
concept, because all of the eight key treaties address matters governed by federal law, not state
law. 34 Moreover, the Senate did not conceive of self-execution in terms of the political-judicial
concept. For the eight key treaties, it declared in a single paragraph that the treaty was wholly or
partially self-executing AND that it was not “enforceable in United States courts.” If the Senate
understood self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept, those two statements would
be mutually contradictory because, under the political-judicial concept, “self-executing” means
“enforceable in courts.” In contrast, there is no contradiction under the congressional-executive
concept because “self-executing” means that legislation is not needed to authorize federal
executive action pursuant to the treaty. Therefore, the declarations for the eight key treaties make
it abundantly clear that the Senate understood self-execution in terms of the congressionalexecutive concept, not the political-judicial concept. 35
Cong. Rec. 21778); International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, S. Treaty
Doc. 110-13 (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 22465).
31
See 154 Cong. Rec. 20166-20174; 154 Cong. Rec. 21775-21778; 154 Cong Rec. 22464-22465. The two treaties
for which the Senate did not adopt either an SE declaration or an NSE declaration are: Protocol to the North Atlantic
Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of the Republic of Albania, S. Treaty Doc. 110-20 (resolution of ratification at 154
Cong. Rec. 21777); Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of the Republic of Croatia, S.
Treaty Doc. 110-20 (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21777).
32
Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons, S. Treaty Doc. 105-1(B) (resolution
of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 20171) (emphasis added). See also Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, S. Treaty
Doc. 105-1(C) (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 20171); Amendment to Article 1 of Convention on
Conventional Weapons, S. Treaty Doc. 109-10(B) (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 20171).
33
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, S. Treaty Doc. 110-4 (resolution of
ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21776-77) (emphasis added). See also Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, S. Treaty Doc. 106-1(A) (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong.
Rec. 21776); Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, S. Treaty Doc. 110-6
(resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21776); 2005 Fixed Platforms Protocol, S. Treaty Doc. 110-8
(resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 21777); Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, S. Treaty Doc. 10910(C) (resolution of ratification at 154 Cong. Rec. 22464-65).
34
See treaties cited in two previous footnotes.
35
The ALI Discussion Draft claims that one of the eight key declarations—the one attached to the Hague
Convention on Cultural Property—shows only that the Senate rejected the “private right of action” version of SE
doctrine. See Discussion Draft, supra note __, § 106, n.4. With due respect for the Reporters, that claim is not
plausible. None of the eight declarations uses the term “private right of action.” All eight declarations say that the
treaties are not “enforceable in United States courts.” The statement that the treaties are not enforceable in courts,
combined with the statement that the treaties are partially or wholly self-executing, demonstrates clearly that the
Senate understood self-execution in terms of the congressional-executive concept, not the political-judicial concept.
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The ALI Discussion Draft cites the Secretary of State’s report on the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities as evidence that the political branches understand selfexecution in terms of the political-judicial concept. 36 On closer examination, though, the Senate
record for the Disabilities Convention demonstrates persuasively that the political branches do
not understand NSE declarations in terms of the political-judicial concept. The Senate
Committee Report for the Disabilities Convention explains the NSE declaration as follows: “This
[declaration] reflects the shared understanding of the committee and the executive branch that
the provisions of the Treaty are not self-executing, are not directly enforceable in U.S. courts,
and do not confer private rights of action enforceable in the United States.” 37 If the political
branches understood self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept, the statements that
the treaty provisions “are not self-executing” and “not directly enforceable in U.S. courts” would
be entirely redundant. In contrast, the redundancy is eliminated if one construes “not selfexecuting” to mean “not supreme law of the land,” as in the federal-state concept. 38 Under the
federal-state concept, the statements that the treaty provisions are “not directly enforceable” and
“do not confer private rights of action” are not redundant because they both follow as a logical
consequence from the statement that the provisions are “not self-executing” (i.e., not supreme
law of the land).
It is important, here, to highlight a key difference between the Disabilities Convention
and the eight treaties that combine SE declarations with “not enforceable in courts.” Whereas
those eight treaties address matters governed exclusively by federal law, the Disabilities
Convention also addresses matters governed by state law. Hence, the political branches wanted
to clarify that the Disabilities Convention will not operate as a rule of conduct for federal
executive officers (per the congressional-executive concept) and that it will not supersede
conflicting state laws (per the federal-state concept). If the NSE declaration attached to the
Disabilities Convention is construed in accordance with the federal-state concept, it expresses
both ideas simultaneously. Since an NSE treaty is not the “supreme law of the land” under the
federal-state concept, it necessarily follows that it does not operate as a rule of conduct for
federal executive officers.
In sum, analysis of recent Senate treaty actions demonstrates clearly that the Senate does
not understand self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept. Thus, the ALI’s attempt
to define self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept is at odds with the Senate’s
understanding and with part III of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Medellín.

36

See Discussion Draft, § 106, note 4 (citing and quoting S. Treaty Doc. 112-6, at 6).
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, S. Exec. Rep. 112-6 (2012), at 14; see also Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, S. Exec. Rep. 113-12 (2014), at 23 (repeating the identical language).
38
Here, I assume that the statement that a treaty “does not supersede conflicting state laws” is equivalent to a
statement that it is not “the supreme law of the land.”
37
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II.
A Brief History of Self-Execution Doctrine
The standard account of self-execution identifies Chief Justice Marshall’s 1829 opinion
in Foster v. Neilson 39 as the source of modern doctrine. That account is mistaken in several
respects. First, judges cite Foster as authority for the “one-step approach” to SE analysis, but
Marshall applied a “two-step approach” in Foster. 40 Professor Edwin Dickinson invented the
one-step approach in a law review article published in 1926. 41 Second, judges cite Foster as
authority for the federal-state concept of self-execution, but Foster did not implicate state law.
The federal-state concept emerged in the 1950s in response to the advent of modern international
human rights law. Third, the misguided focus on Foster creates the false impression that courts
developed self-execution doctrine. In fact, courts said very little about self-execution before
World War I; legislative and executive materials were the primary sources of authority until the
1920s. Part Two presents a brief history of SE doctrine. This account distinguishes between the
“main channel” of historical development and two “side channels.” 42
A. The Main Channel of Doctrinal Evolution
Phase One: The main body of SE doctrine developed in four phases. In phase one, selfexecution was a constitutional doctrine that corresponded with the congressional-executive
concept (the constitutional doctrine). The SE/NSE dichotomy distinguished between: (a) treaties
that the President has constitutional authority to implement, without awaiting congressional
authorization (self-executing); and (b) treaties that the President lacks authority to implement
until Congress enacts implementing legislation (non-self-executing). Congress discussed selfexecution extensively in debates related to: implementation of the Jay Treaty in 1795-96; 43 an
1815 commercial treaty with Great Britain; 44 the 1867 treaty acquiring Alaska from Russia;45
and an 1884 commercial treaty with Hawaii. 46 Legislators never agreed fully about which
treaties are SE and which ones are NSE. However, they did agree that the SE/NSE distinction
was a federal separation-of-powers concept rooted in U.S. constitutional law, not a treaty
interpretation doctrine rooted in international law. In the nineteenth century, legislative materials
on self-execution were far more voluminous than judicial decisions on the topic.
39

27 U.S. 253 (1829).
See David Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step-Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53
Harv. Int’l L. J. 135 (2012); see also infra notes __ and accompanying text (explaining the “one-step” and “twostep” approaches).
41
Edwin D. Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing?, 20 Am. J. Int’l L. 444 (1926).
42
The account presented here relies heavily on David Sloss, Invisible Constitutional Transformation: The Silent
Death of the Constitution’s Treaty Supremacy Rule (manuscript on file with author) (providing detailed
documentation to support claims made in this section).
43
See 5 Annals of Cong. 426-783; John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of
Treaties, 32 Fordham Int’l L. J. 1209, 1276-94 (2009).
44
See 29 Annals of Cong. 46-54, 419-595, 1019-22; Parry, supra note __, at 1303-16.
45
See 39 Cong. Globe 4055 (40th Cong., 2nd Sess, July 14, 1868); 15 Stat. 198 (July 27, 1868); SAMUEL B.
CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 135-47 (1904).
46
See Treaty with the Hawaiian Islands, H.R. Rep. No. 49-4177 (1887); Jean Galbraith, Congress’s TreatyImplementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 59, 89-93 (2014).
40
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Phase Two: In phase two, the focus shifted from Congress to the executive branch. In
nineteenth century congressional debates, the most contentious constitutional issue involved
treaties reducing import duties. Members of the House of Representatives routinely insisted that
such treaties were constitutionally NSE. 47 To sidestep the constitutional issue, the executive
branch began to insert “condition precedent clauses” in treaties. Those clauses specified that the
treaty would not enter into force internationally until after Congress enacted implementing
legislation. The first such treaty was signed in 1854. 48 Article V specified: “The present treaty
shall take effect as soon as the laws required to carry it into operation shall have been passed by
the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain . . . on the one hand, and by the Congress of the United
States on the other.”
In the late nineteenth century, the executive branch routinely added condition precedent
clauses to treaties affecting import duties. 49 By inserting condition precedent clauses, the
executive branch effectively bypassed legislative debates about whether the treaty was
constitutionally NSE. Since the treaty did not enter into force internationally until after Congress
enacted implementing legislation, the self-execution issue became irrelevant. Condition
precedent clauses can be viewed as the nineteenth century predecessor of modern NSE
declarations, but they differ from NSE declarations in certain respects. Condition precedent
clauses required legislation as a precondition for the treaty to take effect internationally. In
contrast modern NSE declarations do not affect international entry into force. Instead, modern
NSE declarations require legislation as a precondition for the treaty to “take effect” domestically.
(Leave aside, for now, the question of precisely what it means for a treaty to “take effect”
domestically.) By adopting condition precedent clauses, the nineteenth century treaty makers
(i.e., the President and Senate, acting together under the Article II Treaty Power) applied their
power over international law to establish preconditions for the treaty to take effect
internationally. In contrast, by adopting NSE declarations, modern treaty makers apply their
power over domestic law to establish preconditions for the treaty to take effect domestically,
even after it has entered into force internationally. 50
Phase Three: Phase three began in 1926 when Edwin Dickinson published an article
entitled Are the Liquor Treaties Self-Executing? 51 The “liquor treaties” in the article’s title were
a set of bilateral treaties with sixteen countries to help enforce Prohibition-era laws banning
liquor imports.52 Before the treaties were concluded, federal statutes imposed a 12-mile limit on
47

See, e.g., Treaty with the Hawaiian Islands, H.R. Rep. No. 49-4177 (1887); CRANDALL, supra note __, at 135-47.
Fisheries, Commerce, and Navigation in North America, June 5, 1854, U.S.-U.K., 10 Stat. 1089.
49
See, e.g., Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871, U.S.-U.K., 17 Stat. 863; Treaty of Reciprocity, Jan. 30, 1875, U.S.Hawaii, 19 Stat. 625; Convention on Commerce, Jan. 20, 1883, U.S.-Mexico, 24 Stat. 975; Convention on
Commercial Relations, Dec. 11, 1902, U.S.-Cuba, 33 Stat. 2136.
50
It is generally agreed that the effect of NSE declarations is purely domestic. Scholars disagree about whether
Article II grants the treaty makers the power to regulate domestic law in a way that is not contingent upon the
international obligation in the treaty. See infra notes __ and accompanying text. Here, I assume that Article II does
grant the treaty makers a limited power of that type.
51
Dickinson, supra note __.
52
See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 109 n.2 (1933) (citing treaties).
48
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the Coast Guard’s search-and-seizure operations at sea. 53 So-called “rum runners” evaded
enforcement of federal liquor laws by stationing large vessels with contraband beyond the 12mile limit, and using small, fast boats to ferry liquor from the large, hovering vessels to the coast.
The treaties expanded the geographic reach of the executive’s search-and-seizure authority
beyond the 12-mile limit. However, when federal authorities seized vessels and filed civil
forfeiture claims, or criminal charges against the rum runners, several lower courts dismissed the
charges on the grounds that the liquor treaties were not self-executing. 54 Dickinson sought to
demonstrate that the treaties were self-executing—meaning that the treaties themselves
authorized federal executive action that was prohibited under prior statutes.
From Dickinson’s standpoint, it was not sufficient to show that the treaties authorized
search-and-seizure beyond the 12-mile limit (which they clearly did). 55 He also wanted to show
that the treaties extended the geographic reach of U.S. criminal laws. If the treaties did not have
that effect, he said, they would merely authorize the executive “to search and seize foreign
vessels which are guilty of no offense.” 56 In this respect, Dickinson was mistaken. As the
Supreme Court explained in United States v. Ford—decided in 1927, one year after Dickinson
published his article—“[t]he issue whether the ship was seized within the prescribed limit did not
affect the question of the defendants’ guilt or innocence.” 57 In other words, the vessels hovering
beyond the 12-mile limit were guilty of violating U.S. liquor laws even before the treaties were
adopted. The problem, absent the treaties, was that personnel on those vessels had a valid
defense to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if seizure occurred beyond the 12-mile limit. The
treaties removed that jurisdictional defense by authorizing seizures beyond the 12-mile statutory
limit.58
However, Dickinson wrote his article before the Court decided Ford, and he proceeded
on the mistaken premise that the treaties must expand the geographic reach of federal criminal
law to accomplish their intended goals. Here, he confronted a problem. Leading authorities
suggested that a treaty creating new criminal penalties was constitutionally NSE (meaning that
Congress must enact implementing legislation before the executive is authorized to prosecute
offenders). 59 If a treaty creating new criminal penalties was constitutionally NSE, then one might
infer that a treaty expanding the geographic reach of federal criminal laws was also
constitutionally NSE. At least one lower court had so held. 60 However, Dickinson resisted that
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conclusion. 61 So, he argued, the classification of liquor treaties as SE or NSE should be based on
a treaty interpretation analysis, not a separation-of-powers analysis. 62 By shifting the focus of the
inquiry from a constitutional separation-of-powers analysis to a treaty interpretation analysis,
Dickinson invented the “one-step” approach to SE doctrine.
Here, it is crucial to appreciate the distinction between the “one-step” and “two-step”
approaches. Under the two-step approach, courts perform a treaty interpretation analysis to
ascertain the content and scope of the international obligation codified in the treaty (step one).
Then, in step two, they perform a domestic separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether
legislation is needed to authorize federal executive officers to implement that international
obligation. 63 Under the two-step approach, step two necessarily follows step one because the
separation-of-powers analysis is contingent upon the treaty interpretation analysis. In contrast,
when courts apply the one-step approach, they combine both steps into a single step by
performing a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question.
In his influential law review article, Dickinson urged courts to perform a treaty interpretation
analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question—specifically, the question whether
new federal legislation was needed to authorize prosecution of individuals seized beyond the 12mile limit.
The preceding paragraph explains the distinction between the one-step and two-step
approaches from the judicial perspective. One can also view the distinction from the perspective
of the treaty makers. Under the two-step approach, the treaty makers use their Article II power to
make decisions about the content of the international obligation. Certain domestic consequences
follow from those decisions, but the domestic consequences are contingent upon the international
obligation. Thus, the treaty makers shape domestic law indirectly: by and through the
international obligation. Under the one-step approach, though, the treaty makers use their Article
II power to make decisions about domestic law—specifically, about the allocation of treatyimplementing authority between Congress and the President. Moreover, their decisions about
domestic separation-of-powers issues are not contingent upon the content of the international
obligation. Thus, the one-step approach assumes that the treaty makers can use their Article II
power to shape domestic law directly.
Dickinson defended the one-step approach by citing Marshall’s opinion in Foster v.
Neilson as authority. 64 He claimed that Marshall performed a treaty interpretation analysis in
Foster to distinguish between SE and NSE treaties. As I have explained in detail elsewhere,
Dickinson’s interpretation of Foster was mistaken, because Marshall applied a two-step
approach in Foster. 65 Nevertheless, Dickinson’s one-step approach—sometimes called the
“intent doctrine,” because it focuses on the intent of the treaty makers—soon gained widespread
acceptance. A comparison of the treatment of self-execution in Moore’s Digest and Hackworth’s
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Digest provides evidence of Dickinson’s influence. (The two Digests provide the best evidence
of official State Department views at the time they were published.) Moore’s Digest, published
in 1906, said very little about self-execution because there were few relevant judicial decisions at
that time. In his brief references to self-execution, Moore said nothing about the “intent of the
treaty makers,” nor did he endorse a one-step approach to SE analysis. 66 In contrast,
Hackworth’s Digest, published between 1940 and 1944, includes a much more detailed treatment
of self-execution issues. Moreover, Hackworth enthusiastically endorsed Dickinson’s intent
doctrine, in which courts apply a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separationof-powers question. 67
Hackworth probably endorsed the one-step approach because it supported the rise of
executive discretion in foreign affairs. Professor White has documented the fact that, in the
period between the two world wars, several distinct doctrinal developments contributed to a
transfer of constitutional foreign affairs powers from Congress to the executive. 68 Dickinson’s
one-step approach was one such development. His approach assumed that the President has
discretion, in his treaty-making capacity, to alter otherwise applicable separation-of-powers
principles by drafting treaty language that vests treaty-implementing authority in the executive
branch, rather than Congress. 69
The shift from a two-step to a one-step approach raises two distinct issues. First, from a
constitutional standpoint, does Article II grant the treaty makers the power to shape domestic law
directly, in a way that is not contingent upon the content of the international obligation? For the
purpose of this article, I assume that the answer is “yes.” 70 Second, and of more immediate
interest here, the one-step approach induces courts to decide cases by reference to a fictitious
“intent of the treaty makers.” Let us assume that Article II does grant the treaty makers the power
to make decisions about domestic separation-of-powers issues that are not contingent upon the
content of the international obligation. Even so, the fact remains that the treaty makers rarely
exercise that power. Thus, if a court asks how a particular treaty allocates treaty-implementing
responsibility between Congress and the President, the correct answer in most cases is that the
treaty does not address that question. Nevertheless, the accepted doctrine under the one-step
approach directs courts to apply a treaty interpretation analysis to decide whether legislation is
needed to authorize executive action to implement the treaty. 71 Since the treaty does not answer
that question (in most cases), courts fabricate a fictitious “intent of the treaty makers.”
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In sum, Dickinson’s article had tremendous influence over the subsequent development
of SE doctrine because he initiated the shift from a two-step to a one-step approach. Under the
one-step approach, courts apply a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separationof-powers question. Since most treaties do not answer that question, courts create a fictitious
“intent of the treaty makers.” Over the past few decades, application of the fictitious intent test
has become the dominant approach to judicial analysis of self-execution issues.
Phase Four: In phase four, lawyers and judges expanded the concept of self-execution to
encompass the previously distinct doctrine of treaty supremacy. From the Founding until World
War II, treaty supremacy doctrine and self-execution doctrine were independent, nonoverlapping doctrines. Treaty supremacy addressed the relationship between treaties and state
law. The treaty supremacy rule consisted of two elements: first, treaties supersede conflicting
state laws; second, courts have a constitutional duty to apply treaties that conflict with state laws.
Before World War II, self-execution doctrine operated purely on a federal separation-of-powers
level. It addressed the division of authority over treaty implementation between Congress and the
President. Indeed, Quincy Wright wrote in 1951: “the distinction between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties has been used in American constitutional law only with reference to
the agency of the Federal Government competent to execute the treaty and has had no reference
to the relations between the Federal Government and the States.” 72 Thus, before World War II,
treaty supremacy doctrine applied to treaties that intersected with areas of state regulatory
authority and self-execution doctrine applied to treaties that intersected with areas of federal
regulatory authority. There was no NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule because the
concept of self-execution did not apply to treaty supremacy cases—i.e., cases involving an
alleged conflict between a treaty and state law. 73
This picture changed dramatically after World War II. Adoption of the UN Charter and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights unleashed a flood of litigation in U.S. courts between
1948 and 1954 in which plaintiffs invoked the Charter’s human rights provisions in conjunction
with the treaty supremacy rule to challenge state and local laws that discriminated on the basis of
race or nationality. 74 Consistent with the traditional approach—which placed treaty supremacy
and self-execution in separate “baskets”—courts initially decided those cases without reference
to self-execution doctrine. In the celebrated Fujii case, an intermediate appellate court in
California ruled that California’s Alien Land Law was invalid because it conflicted with the UN
Charter’s human rights provisions. 75 In short, the lower court decided Fujii as a treaty supremacy
case, not a self-execution case.
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The Fujii decision sparked a huge political firestorm, which in turn generated support for
a proposed constitutional amendment, known as the Bricker Amendment. 76 One key goal of the
Bricker Amendment was to abolish the treaty supremacy rule. 77 Opponents of the Bricker
Amendment argued that a constitutional amendment was unnecessary because Article II granted
the treaty makers the power to opt out of the treaty supremacy rule on a case-by-case basis.
Attorney General Brownell, Secretary of State Dulles, and Harold Stassen (Director of the
Mutual Security Administration) all presented variants of this argument in their official Senate
testimony on the Bricker Amendment. 78 The New York City Bar Association made a similar
argument. 79 The minority view in the Senate Judiciary Committee report advanced this
argument. 80 Senator George presented the argument during floor debate. 81 President Eisenhower,
himself, made a similar argument in a private letter to John McCloy. 82 They all articulated a
similar message: “A constitutional amendment is unnecessary, because the treaty makers have
the power to decide that a treaty shall not supersede conflicting state laws, and they can exercise
that power by specifying—either in the treaty itself, or in a unilateral reservation—that the treaty
is not self-executing.” Thus was born the “NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule,” or the
“optional treaty supremacy rule.” The claim that the treaty supremacy rule is optional played a
key role in defeating the Bricker Amendment.
Here, it is important to understand the conceptual shift that created the optional treaty
supremacy rule. First, in the period between about 1926 and 1943, the one-step approach to selfexecution became the accepted doctrine. 83 Under the one-step approach, Article II grants the
treaty makers the power to decide whether a treaty is SE or NSE, and they can exercise that
power in a manner that is not contingent upon the content of the international obligation. Then,
between about 1949 and 1954, lawyers expanded the concept of self-execution beyond the
congressional-executive concept to encompass the federal-state concept. By combining the onestep approach with the federal-state concept, the NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule was
born. After 1954, a new constitutional understanding established that Article II grants the treaty
makers the power to decide, on a case-by-case basis, whether a treaty supersedes conflicting state
laws. According to this new constitutional understanding: 1) the treaty makers decide in the
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context of treaty negotiation and ratification whether the treaty is SE or NSE (the one-step
approach); and 2) an NSE treaty does not supersede conflicting state laws (the federal-state
concept). The Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, published in 1965, endorsed the
NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule. 84 So, too, did Whiteman’s Digest of International
Law, published in 1970, 85 and Professor Henkin’s leading treatise on U.S. foreign relations law,
published in 1972. 86
The new constitutional understanding that emerged from the Bricker Amendment
controversy awakened the ghost of Madison’s monster. Since the one-step approach induces
courts to decide cases by reference to a fictitious “intent of the treaty makers,” and since the
classification of a treaty as “non-self-executing” now means that the treaty does not supersede
conflicting state laws, the result is that courts apply a fictitious intent test to determine whether it
is permissible for state and local government officers to breach U.S. treaty obligations. Indeed,
that is precisely what the Supreme Court did in Medellín. Before addressing Medellín though, we
must address the “side channels” of self-execution doctrine that developed in parallel with the
main channel.
B. Two Side Channels
The canonical view of SE doctrine traces the origins of the doctrine to Chief Justice
Marshall’s 1829 opinion in Foster v. Neilson. 87 In contrast, the historical account presented here
suggests that Foster did not become an important source of authority for SE doctrine until Edwin
Dickinson published his transformative article almost one hundred years later. The ALI’s recent
Discussion Draft defines self-execution in terms of the political-judicial concept. 88 In contrast,
the preceding historical account largely ignored the political-judicial concept. This section first
addresses Foster and then turns to the political-judicial concept of self-execution.
Foster v. Neilson:
I have written extensively about Foster elsewhere. To avoid repetition, I make a few brief
points here and refer readers to other sources for supporting details. 89 First, Foster provides no
support for an NSE exception to the treaty supremacy rule because there was no state law at
issue in Foster. Foster involved a dispute over title to real property. The plaintiffs’ claim was
based on a Spanish land grant, which they alleged was protected by Article 8 of the 1819 treaty
between the United States and Spain (the “Florida treaty”). 90 The published decision in Foster
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does not specify the legal basis of defendant’s claim. However, we know from other sources that
defendant’s asserted property right was based on federal law, not state law. Daniel Webster
represented the plaintiffs in Foster. Webster’s papers specify that the defendant, David Neilson,
was “the occupant under a United States grant.” 91 Additionally, in his oral argument, Webster
conceded that if the Court rejected the validity of plaintiffs’ Spanish land grant, then the land
“belonged to the United States or her grantees.” 92 David Neilson was one of those grantees. As
the recipient of a grant from the federal government, Neilson’s property claim was based on
federal law, not state law.
Second, Marshall’s treaty interpretation analysis in Foster focused on the nineteenth
century distinction between executory and executed treaties, not the modern distinction between
SE and NSE treaties. The SE/NSE distinction involves a “who” question: is treaty
implementation the responsibility of Congress, the President, or the courts? The
executed/executory distinction involves a “when” question: does the treaty accomplish its goal
immediately upon entry into force, or is future action necessary to implement the treaty? Article
8 of the Florida Treaty specified that land grants by Spanish authorities “shall be ratified and
confirmed to the persons in possession of the lands.” 93 In Foster, Marshall distinguished this
language from hypothetical language stating that land “grants are hereby confirmed.” 94 “Had
such been its language,” said Marshall, “it would have acted directly on the subject.” 95 In other
words, it would have been executed, not executory, because no future action would be necessary
to implement a provision stating that grants “are hereby confirmed.” However, according to
Marshall’s analysis, since Article 8 specified that the land grants “shall be ratified and
confirmed,” the treaty merely “pledge[d] the faith of the United States to pass acts which shall
ratify and confirm” the grants. 96 In other words, he concluded that Article 8 was executory,
because it obligated the United States to take future action to confirm the grants. Richard Smith
Coxe, Daniel Webster’s co-counsel, said shortly after the Foster decision that the Court
construed “the treaty of 1819 as an executory contract between the two nations, which did not of
itself confirm the existing titles, but merely stipulated that they should be confirmed.” 97
The Court decided United States v. Percheman 98 four years after Foster. Joseph White,
the attorney who represented Percheman, compared the English and Spanish versions of Article
8 of the Florida Treaty. He argued that “[t]he English side of the treaty leaves the ratification of
the grants executory—they shall be ratified; the Spanish, executed—they shall continue
acknowledged and confirmed.” 99 Marshall’s analysis of the Spanish and English texts closely
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tracked White’s argument in Percheman. 100 Marshall contrasted the Spanish version—which (as
newly retranslated) specified that grants “shall remain ratified and confirmed”—with the original
English version, which specified that grants “shall be ratified and confirmed.” 101 He concluded
that Article 8 was executed, as it applied to Percheman’s land, because the United States did not
need to take any future action to perfect Percheman’s already-perfect title. 102 Although Marshall
did not use the words “executed” and “executory,” later nineteenth century Supreme Court
opinions confirm that Marshall’s analysis in Foster and Percheman focused on the distinction
between executory and executed treaty provisions. 103
Finally, Marshall applied a two-step approach in Foster, not a one-step approach.
Marshall’s conclusion that Article 8 of the Florida treaty was NSE was not based solely on a
treaty interpretation analysis. His treaty interpretation analysis focused on an international law
question: whether Article 8 was executory or executed. His conclusion that Article 8 was NSE
involved a second step: a domestic separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether the treaty
required legislative implementation. 104 Granted, step two of the two-step analysis in Foster was
implicit, not explicit. Thus, the two-step interpretation of Foster is problematic in that it assumes
that Marshall failed to explain a critical step in his analysis. However, the one-step interpretation
is even more problematic, because it assumes that Marshall made a fundamental category
mistake by applying a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers
question that the treaty did not address. I prefer to think that Marshall’s SE analysis in Foster
was merely incomplete, rather than accusing Marshall of failing to understand the difference
between an international law question (the “when” question) and a domestic separation-ofpowers question (the “who” question). Moreover, if one construes Foster in accordance with the
two-step approach, then Foster provides a useful template for modern SE doctrine. In contrast, if
one construes Foster in accordance with the one-step approach, the case is simply a prescription
for courts to engage in arbitrary judicial decision-making by applying a fictitious intent test.
The Political-Judicial Concept and NSE Declarations
The preceding account of SE doctrine is incomplete in one important respect: the history
before World War II focuses on the branch of SE doctrine involving the congressional-executive
concept. Even in the nineteenth century, though, a separate branch of SE doctrine applied the
political-judicial concept. That branch of SE doctrine is often called the “justiciability”
doctrine. 105 Traditional justiciability doctrine involves a two-step analysis. In step one, courts
apply a treaty interpretation analysis to ascertain the content of the international obligation. In
step two, courts apply a domestic separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether the
100
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judicial branch is competent to enforce that particular treaty obligation. The justiciability
doctrine does not raise the specter of fictitious intent because courts do not apply a treaty
interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question.
During the 1970s or later, lawyers began combining the political-judicial concept with
the one-step approach. The precise origins of this particular doctrinal shift are not entirely clear,
but the combination of the political-judicial concept with the one-step approach is closely related
to the modern practice of attaching NSE declarations to treaties. NSE declarations involve a onestep approach because—when the treaty makers adopt an NSE declaration—they use their
Article II power to control domestic implementation directly, in a way that is not contingent
upon the content of the international obligation. 106
The practice of ratifying treaties subject to NSE declarations raises two distinct sets of
questions. First, what is the proper interpretation of NSE declarations? The United States ratified
three human rights treaties with NSE declarations in the period from 1992 to 1994. Those were
the first treaties that the United States ratified subject to NSE declarations. Congress and the
executive branch explained those declarations in accordance with the “private right of action
doctrine,” which is a variant of the political-judicial concept. 107 However, more recent political
branch practice suggests that NSE declarations are properly construed in accordance with the
congressional-executive concept or the federal-state concept, not the political-judicial concept. 108
Second, the practice of ratifying treaties subject to NSE declarations raises constitutional
questions. Several scholars have challenged the constitutional validity of NSE declarations; 109
others have defended the practice. 110 In my view, much of the constitutional debate has been offtarget because scholars attempt to answer the constitutional question without addressing the
interpretive question. One cannot present a coherent analysis of the constitutional issues without
first establishing the correct interpretation of NSE declarations. Space does not permit a detailed
analysis of the constitutional issues here. Suffice it to say that, in my view, the NSE declarations
are constitutionally valid if they are construed in accordance with the congressional-executive
concept, or the federal-state concept, or the private right of action doctrine. 111 Professor Bradley
has defended the constitutional validity of NSE declarations on the theory that such declarations
should be construed in accordance with the political-judicial concept, and that the declarations
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bar judicial enforcement of the subject treaties by all litigants in all cases. 112 Bradley’s argument
relies on the unstated premise that Article II grants the treaty makers an unlimited power to order
courts to refrain from applying supreme federal law. The ALI’s Discussion Draft also appears to
endorse this position. 113 As I have explained elsewhere, Professor Bradley’s position is at odds
with the principle of judicial independence and with entrenched Supreme Court doctrine
protecting the due process rights of criminal defendants. 114
Regardless, debates about the constitutional validity of NSE declarations are largely
theoretical. From a practical standpoint, the fictitious intent problem is the main problem
associated with modern NSE doctrine. The fictitious intent problem does not arise when the
treaty makers adopt an NSE declaration because, in that case, the treaty makers have expressed
their intentions in a concrete form. Similarly, the fictitious intent problem does not arise when
courts apply a two-step approach (as in the justiciability doctrine), because under the two-step
approach courts do not apply a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-ofpowers question. However, the fictitious intent problem becomes a serious problem when the
treaty makers have not adopted an NSE declaration and courts apply a one-step approach in
conjunction with the political-judicial concept. In such cases, courts apply a treaty interpretation
analysis to answer a question that treaties do not typically address: whether domestic courts are
the appropriate government agents to enforce U.S. treaty obligations. Part Three analyzes the
Supreme Court decision in Medellín to show how the one-step approach induces courts to engage
in arbitrary judicial decision-making by applying a fictitious intent test.
III
Fictitious Intent in Medellin
The Supreme Court held in Medellín that Article 94 of the UN Charter is not selfexecuting. The Court relied primarily on the treaty text and the Senate record associated with
treaty ratification to support its conclusion that the treaty makers intended Article 94 to be nonself-executing. 115 Unfortunately, a vast gulf separates the actual evidence of the treaty makers’
intentions from the conclusions that the Court reached on the basis of that evidence. Part Three
examines Medellín to illustrate the problems associated with the fictitious intent doctrine. The
first section addresses the Court’s opinion in Medellín. The next section provides an independent
analysis of the Senate record associated with ratification of the UN Charter. The final section
discusses, in more general terms, the problems associated with judicial reliance on fictitious
intent.
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A. The Court’s Opinion in Medellín
Chief Justice Roberts began his textual analysis by quoting Article 94(1), which says that
“[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any
case to which it is a party.” He construed the italicized language to mean that States made a
commitment “to take future action through their political branches to comply with an ICJ
decision.” 116 Here, the Chief Justice made the classic mistake—which is endemic in selfexecution doctrine—of conflating a “when” question with a “who” question. He correctly noted
that the phrase “undertakes to comply” is a promise of future action. In nineteenth century terms,
Article 94(1) is executory, not executed, because treaty ratification, without more, does not
accomplish the goal to be accomplished. 117 The text of Article 94 answers the “when” question:
it is a promise of future action.
However, the text of Article 94(1) does not answer the “who” question. The text does not
support the Court’s conclusion that compliance is to be achieved “through their political
branches.” As Roberts himself correctly noted in a different case, the “rules of domestic law
generally govern the [domestic] implementation of an international treaty.” 118 Consistent with
this understanding, the drafters of the UN Charter did not attempt to answer the “who” question.
They did not purport to decide which branch of government in the United States would be
responsible for compliance with ICJ decisions, because they recognized that domestic law
ordinarily governs the internal allocation of responsibility for treaty implementation. Therefore,
the text of Article 94(1) does not support Roberts’ conclusion that the treaty makers intended to
vest responsibility for compliance with ICJ decisions in the political branches, rather than the
courts.
Roberts turned next to Article 94(2), which states: “If any party to a case fails to perform
the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may
have recourse to the Security Council, which may . . . decide upon measures to be taken to give
effect to the judgment.” 119 Based on this language, the Court concluded that referral to the
Security Council is “the sole remedy for noncompliance.” Additionally, the Court said that the
“Charter’s provision of an express diplomatic—that is, nonjudicial—remedy is itself evidence
that ICJ judgments were not meant to be enforceable in domestic courts.” 120 With due respect for
the Chief Justice, the text of Article 94(2) provides absolutely no support for the conclusions he
purports to derive from that text. First, the statement that “the other party may have recourse to
the Security Council” simply identifies one option. It does not exclude other options, as Roberts
would have us believe. Second, and more importantly, the text addresses enforcement between
States in the international sphere. It says nothing whatsoever about remedies for individuals in
the domestic sphere. This should come as no surprise because, to quote the Chief Justice again,
“rules of domestic law generally govern the [domestic] implementation of an international
116
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treaty.” 121 The question whether an individual can obtain a remedy in a domestic court is a
question about the domestic implementation of the treaty. The drafters of the UN Charter chose
not to answer that question because they recognized that it is a question governed by domestic
law.
The preceding paragraphs address the entirety of Roberts’ textual analysis in Medellín. In
sum, the drafters of the UN Charter could have said something in the text about whether Article
94 has the status of domestic law in the United States. They could have said something in the
text about which branch of government in the United States is responsible for ensuring
compliance with ICJ decisions. They could have said something in the text about whether
individuals have access to domestic courts in the United States to obtain remedies for violations
of Article 94. However, the drafters of the UN Charter chose not to address any of those
questions because they assumed that the answers to those questions would be governed by U.S.
domestic law! Therefore, insofar as Roberts relied on the treaty text to support his conclusions
about the treaty makers’ intentions, his reliance was misplaced. The ostensible “intent of the
treaty makers” that Roberts claimed to find on the basis of the treaty text is sheer judicial fantasy,
without foundation in any actual agreement of the treaty’s drafters.
Roberts did not rest his decision solely on the treaty text. He also examined the Senate
record associated with treaty ratification to support his conclusion that the treaty makers intended
Article 94 to be non-self-executing. Here, Roberts quoted three different statements from the
Senate record. 122 First, he quoted an excerpt from Secretary of State Edward Stettinius’ report to
President Truman. 123 The quoted language repeats, almost verbatim, the language in Article
94(2) about recourse to the Security Council. 124 It says nothing whatsoever about the status of
the UN Charter as federal law in the United States, or the allocation of responsibility for treaty
implementation among the branches of the U.S. government.
Second, Roberts quoted a statement by Leo Pasvolsky, a Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State. Pasvolsky said: “When the [ICJ] has rendered a judgment and one of the
parties refuses to accept it, then the dispute becomes political rather than legal. It is as a political
dispute that the matter is referred to the Security Council.” 125 Viewed in context, it is abundantly
clear that Pasvolsky was referring to disputes between States on the international plane. 126 He
was not referring to disputes between individuals and state governments in the United States—
the type of dispute at issue in Medellín. Here, it is helpful to recall a distinction that Chief Justice
John Marshall made more than two centuries ago between a case “carried before a court as an
individual claim” and “a national demand made upon the nation [where] [t]he parties were the
121
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two nations.” 127 Marshall said that domestic courts are competent to adjudicate a case “carried
before a court as an individual claim.” However, a demand made upon the nation “is not a case
for judicial cognizance.” 128 In Marshall’s terms, Medellín’s habeas corpus petition was a case
“carried before a court as an individual claim.” In contrast, Pasvolky’s statement in the Senate
hearings addressed “a national demand made upon the nation.” Pasvolsky neither stated nor
implied that domestic courts are not competent to adjudicate individual claims that are based, in
part, on Article 94.
Third, Roberts quoted a statement by Mr. Charles Fahy, the State Department Legal
Advisor. Roberts cited Fahy’s statement to support the Court’s conclusion that “Article 94(2)
provides the exclusive means of enforcement” for ICJ decisions. 129 Here, Roberts used the term
“exclusive” to signify that the treaty makers intended to preclude domestic judicial enforcement.
However, Fahy’s statement does not support that inference. Fahy said that “there is no provision
for the enforcement of such [ICJ] decisions unless the failure to comply constitutes a threat to the
peace or breach of the peace.” 130 As above, the context makes it perfectly clear that Fahy was
talking about enforcement between States on the international plane. He was not talking about
enforcement by individuals on the domestic plane. Granted, the UN Charter and the ICJ Statute
contain “no provision for the enforcement” of ICJ decisions on the domestic plane. However, the
decision by the Charter’s drafters to say nothing about domestic judicial enforcement is not
evidence of an intention to preclude domestic judicial enforcement in the United States. To the
contrary, it is evidence of a widely shared understanding that the United States would decide for
itself, in accordance with its own domestic legal rules, whether and how to provide for domestic
judicial enforcement of the treaty obligation to comply with ICJ decisions.
The record of a different treaty negotiation in the 1940s confirms this view. At the 1949
meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights, the United States proposed an amendment to
the draft Covenant on Human Rights. The proposed amendment provided in part: “The
provisions of this Covenant shall not themselves become effective as domestic law.” 131 The
representative from the Philippines objected to the U.S. proposal. He explained that, in the
Philippines, “all international treaties and conventions, when ratified were incorporated without
further formalities in domestic law.” The U.S. proposal, even if adopted, “could not change the
constitutional rule of the Philippines.” 132 The Lebanese representative added that the appropriate
mechanism for incorporating the Covenant into domestic law “was entirely a question of the
constitutional law of States; there was no reason why the Covenant should interfere with the
application of that law.” 133 After further discussion, the Commission voted against the U.S.
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proposal. 134 The Commission’s rejection of the proposed U.S. amendment manifested a shared
understanding that the question whether the Covenant would be directly applicable as domestic
law would be governed by the domestic law of individual States, not by the terms of the
Covenant. The diplomats who negotiated the UN Charter in 1945 had a similar understanding.
In sum, Roberts’ treaty interpretation analysis in Medellín is akin to analyzing regulations
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to answer a question about
California tort law. The fact that SEC regulations say nothing about tort remedies in California
does not mean that there are no tort remedies in California. Roberts was misled by the one-step
approach, which induced him to perform a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a question that
the treaty did not answer.
B. Independent Analysis of the Senate Record
The Senate record associated with ratification of the UN Charter consists of the following
documents: Secretary of State Stettinius’ Report to the President (“Stettinius Report”), 135 the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report (“SFRC Report”), 136 the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Hearings (“SFRC Hearings”), 137 and records of the Senate floor debate reproduced in
the Congressional Record (“floor debate”). 138 I searched those documents to determine what the
treaty makers said about self-execution.
The term “self-executing” does not appear in the Stettinius Report, the SFRC Report, or
the Senate Hearings. It does appear in three places in the Congressional Record. Senator Hill said
that the United States Constitution is not self-executing. Specifically, he said, the Constitution
“proved to be a tremendous step . . . . But it could be only a step, for no such document, however
wisely or prophetically drawn, can be self-executing.” He added: “And so it is with the Charter of
the United Nations Organization. It is a step, a magnificent and hopeful step, for peace can never
be achieved if we are afraid even to try. 139 Obviously, this statement says nothing about the
allocation of responsibility for implementing the Charter among the branches of the federal
government.
Senator White used the term “self-executing” to describe the proposed Article 43
agreement between the United States and the United Nations. (Article 43 of the Charter
envisions agreements between the United Nations and member states “to make available to the
Security Council . . . armed forces, assistance, and facilities . . . .”140) Referring to the
anticipated Article 43 agreement, he said that the agreement “will not be of itself self-executing.
It will call for the appointment of officials; it will call for the expenditure of public funds. Those
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will be authorized, I take it, by the Congress of the United States acting in its legislative
capacity.” 141
Senator Revercomb was the only Senator who used the term “self-executing” to refer
specifically to the Charter. He said:
This Charter is not self-executing. It requires future implementing legislation. It
requires future legislation to fix . . . the powers and the limitations of the [U.S.]
representatives who will take part in administering the new organization. Even
legislation will be required fixing the appointment of our representative [to the
United Nations] and the method of his appointment. Likewise, the Congress will
act later upon the question of the number of troops and the armaments to be used
in effectuating the purposes of the Charter and also the extent to which such
troops may be used. 142
This statement is the most detailed statement by any member of the legislative or executive
branch addressing the need for legislation to implement the Charter. Notably, Senator
Revercomb did not suggest that legislation would be needed to implement the Article 94
obligation to comply with ICJ decisions.
In addition to searching for the term “self-executing,” I reviewed the Senate record to
find answers to three questions: 1) did the U.S. treaty makers believe that Article 94 of the UN
Charter would automatically supersede conflicting state laws? (the federal-state concept); 2) did
they believe that Article 94 would require implementing legislation to authorize federal
executive action? (the congressional-executive concept); and 3) did they believe that the Article
94 obligation to comply with ICJ decisions was directly enforceable in domestic courts (the
political-judicial concept)? In brief, the treaty makers did not specifically address any of these
questions, so the Court in Medellín was wrong to conclude that the treaty makers had a shared
intent regarding any of these questions.
First, several Senators affirmed the principle that the UN Charter, when ratified, would be
the supreme law of the land. Senator Ferguson said: “Mr. President, when we ratify this treaty it
will become the supreme law of the land, because the Constitution provides that a treaty ratified
and consented to by the Senate shall be the supreme law of the land.” 143 Similarly, Senator
Thomas said: “[W]hen we enter into this agreement, and when the United Nations Charter
becomes a treaty accepted by us . . . [w]e agree to every provision in it when we accept it.
Therefore . . . the treaty becomes the supreme law of the land.” 144 Senator Lucas quoted the
language of the Supremacy Clause and said: “The treaty becomes the highest law of the land. We
should keep this clearly in mind as we discharge the duty of our offices . . . . When we enter into
this treaty we ought to do so with an understanding of the spirit of the Constitution, which makes
treaties the supreme law of the land.” 145 There is not a single statement in the Senate record
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contradicting this view. Moreover, as of 1945, the prevailing understanding of the Supremacy
Clause was that “supreme law of the land” meant that a treaty supersedes conflicting state
laws. 146 Therefore—although there is no evidence that the treaty makers specifically intended
Article 94 to supersede conflicting state laws, and there is no evidence that they anticipated any
such conflict—key Senators and executive officials probably shared the belief that the UN
Charter, including Article 94, would supersede conflicting state laws if a conflict ever arose. In
any case, there is not a scintilla of evidence to support the view that the treaty makers made a
conscious choice to opt out of the Constitution’s treaty supremacy rule when the U.S. ratified the
UN Charter.
The Senate record includes numerous statements addressing the need for legislation to
implement particular Charter provisions. However, no legislative or executive officer stated or
implied that legislation would be needed to implement U.S. obligations under Article 94. The
Stettinius Report said that legislation would be needed to implement Articles 104 and 105 (which
involve the “legal capacity” and “privileges and immunities” of the United Nations and
associated personnel). 147 The SFRC Report indicated that legislation would be needed to
determine the scope of “authority of the United States delegate” to the UN Security Council. 148
Some non-governmental witnesses said that legislation would be needed to authorize “the
establishment of an International Monetary Fund and an International Bank.” 149
Anna Lord Strauss, the President of the National League of Women Voters, presented the
most detailed analysis of the need for implementing legislation. She identified two categories of
legislation. First, legislation would be “needed following ratification to get the Organization into
operation.” 150 Under this heading, she included: legislation to define “the powers of the United
States delegate on the Security Council;” “[a]rrangements concerning United States forces to be
placed at the disposal of the Security Council;” and “[a]ppropriations for our share of the United
Nations Organization expenses.” 151 Her second category involved “longer-range legislation
connected with the Organization.” She included in this category legislation related to U.S.
“membership in the subsidiary organizations of the Economic and Social Council,” and
“[a]cceptance by the United States of the optional clause giving compulsory jurisdiction to the
World Court.” 152
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The Senate record makes clear that the executive branch, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and various non-governmental witnesses carefully analyzed the need for legislation
to implement various Charter provisions. Collectively, they identified several different Charter
provisions that required implementing legislation. However, there is not a single statement in the
hundreds of pages of documents comprising the Senate record suggesting that legislation would
be needed to implement U.S. obligations under Article 94 of the Charter. The Court’s conclusion
in Medellín that the United States made an affirmative decision, at the time of ratification, to
require legislative implementation for Article 94 is sheer judicial fantasy, without a shred of
supporting evidence.
The final question concerns the role of domestic courts in implementing the Charter. The
SFRC Report does not address domestic judicial enforcement. The Stettinius Report includes one
reference to domestic courts. It says: “The International Court of Justice . . . has an important
part to play in developing international law just as the courts of England and America have
helped to form the common law.” 153 Apart from that statement, no government official who
testified during the SFRC Hearings discussed the role of domestic courts in implementing the
Charter. 154 Several non-governmental witnesses made passing references to domestic courts
during the SFRC Hearings, 155 but no witness specifically addressed the question whether U.S.
obligations under Article 94 would be enforceable in domestic courts. The Senate devoted six
days of floor time to discussing the Charter. During floor debate, not a single Senator expressed a
view about whether the Charter would be enforceable in domestic courts. The statement that
comes closest to addressing that issue is a statement by Senator George. He said: “Surely no
American should scoff at international law, because time after time our own Supreme Court has
recognized the law of nations, and has given effect to the law of nations, which is but another
term for international law, and has applied the principles of international law in the adjudications
made by our own courts.” 156 Based on this statement, one could infer that Senator George
believed that some of the Charter’s provisions would be enforceable in U.S. courts. Still, he said
nothing about Article 94, and his statement does not express a consensus Senate view.
In sum, the Court’s opinion in Medellín might be construed to mean that Article 94 is not
enforceable in domestic courts because the treaty makers decided, at the time of ratification, to
bar domestic judicial enforcement. However, the Senate record demonstrates conclusively that
the President and Senate did not make any such decision. The hundreds of pages of documents
comprising the Senate record do not include a single statement by any legislative or executive
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official expressing any opinion about whether Article 94 is enforceable in domestic courts.
Insofar as the majority opinion in Medellín suggests otherwise, there is not a shred of evidence to
support the Court’s conclusion.
C. The Problem of Fictitious Intent
Unfortunately, Roberts’ opinion in Medellín is consistent with a long line of lower court
decisions that reach conclusions about self-execution on the basis of a fictitious, judicially
created “intent of the treaty makers.” Judicial reliance on fictitious intent is the product of a
flawed methodology that is, in turn, the product of a mistaken interpretation of Foster v. Neilson.
As explained above, Marshall applied a two-step approach in Foster. He performed a treaty
interpretation analysis to answer an international law question and he performed a domestic
separation-of-powers analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question. 157 However,
contemporary lawyers believe that Marshall applied a one-step approach, in which he performed
a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-of-powers question. This
misinterpretation of Foster has become so deeply embedded in contemporary legal culture that
commentators routinely refer to the one-step approach as “Foster-type non-self-execution.” 158
In Medellín, Roberts relied on this mistaken interpretation of Foster to justify his view
that courts have an “obligation to interpret treaty provisions to determine whether they are selfexecuting.” 159 The asserted “obligation” is problematic because the question whether a treaty is
self-executing is a domestic separation-of-powers question. The diplomats who draft treaties do
not typically use treaties to answer separation-of-powers questions. Hence, the view that courts
are obligated to perform a treaty interpretation analysis to answer a domestic separation-ofpowers question leads, almost inevitably, to judicial reliance on fictitious intent. Judges believe
they are required, as a matter of legal doctrine, to base their self-execution decisions on treaty
interpretation. Treaties rarely address the self-execution question because treaty negotiators view
self-execution as a domestic legal question. Since the treaty says nothing about self-execution,
and courts believe they must perform a treaty interpretation analysis to decide whether a treaty is
SE or NSE, judges are effectively backed into a corner where judicial creation of a fictitious
intent provides the only escape hatch.
Judicial reliance on fictitious intent creates three distinct problems. First, judicial
decision-making is arbitrary. We expect courts to decide cases by applying established legal
principles to new factual situations. Application of law to fact necessarily involves some
discretion, but judicial discretion is bounded by the need to conform to established legal
principles. With respect to SE doctrine, though, established principles do not impose any
meaningful boundaries on judicial discretion. The established principles direct judges to decide
cases by determining whether the treaty makers intended the treaty to be self-executing. In the
vast majority of cases, the treaty makers had no intention regarding self-execution. (Medellín is a
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good example.) Hence, judges are free to reach any decision that supports their policy
preferences, without fear of contravening a non-existent “intent.”
The second problem relates to treaty compliance. When the President ratifies a treaty, he
makes a binding commitment on behalf of the nation that the United States will comply with its
treaty obligations. Generally speaking, the Senate does not consent to ratification unless the
Senate agrees, by the requisite two-thirds majority, that it is in our national interest to comply
with the treaty. Therefore, the act of ratification is itself powerful evidence that the President and
Senate intend to comply with the treaty. 160 When courts are presented with a self-execution
question, they would probably reach a result consistent with the treaty makers’ intentions if they
asked whether the treaty makers intended to comply, instead of asking whether they intended the
treaty to be self-executing. If the treaty makers did intend to comply (which is usually true), and
a finding of self-execution is necessary to achieve treaty compliance (which is sometimes true), a
self-execution holding would give effect to the treaty makers’ intentions. Instead, though, courts
often find that a treaty is NSE in circumstances where that finding results in non-compliance,
even though the treaty makers fully intended to comply. (Again, Medellín is a good example.) In
short, judicial reliance on fictitious intent tends to subvert the treaty makers’ actual intention to
comply with the treaty.
The third problem relates to accountability. The Constitution grants the federal political
branches power to violate a binding treaty obligation. Scholars debate whether this power
belongs exclusively to Congress, or whether the President has an independent power to violate
treaties. Regardless, no reputable scholar claims that the Constitution grants state governments,
or federal courts, the power to violate treaties. Even so, as a practical matter, NSE doctrine grants
state government officials and federal courts the power to make decisions that are attributable to
the United States under international law, and that constitute a violation of U.S. treaty
obligations. Judges and state officers try to evade responsibility for their actions by claiming that
the political branches decided that the relevant treaty is NSE, and that the treaty violation is
merely a consequence of that decision. However, in many cases, the claim that the treaty makers
decided that the treaty is NSE is based on a judicially created, fictitious intent. Consequently, the
United States breaches its treaty obligations, even though the President and Senate made a
purposeful decision at the time of ratification to comply with the treaty and no politically
accountable federal official ever purposefully decided to violate the treaty. In short, we violate
our treaty commitments but no government officer is accountable. Like a modern Frankenstein,
the fictitious intent doctrine has brought Madison’s monster to life.
IV
Recommendations
Part Four provides recommendations for the political branches and the courts. I divide
those recommendations into two parts. Recommendations for the political branches are designed
to help ensure that they express their intentions clearly. Recommendations for the courts are
160

See Duncan B. Hollis, Treaties—A Cinderella Story, 102 ASIL Proc. 412, 413 (2008).

28

designed to establish an appropriate set of default rules for courts to apply when the political
branches fail to express their intentions clearly.
A. Recommendations for the Political Branches: Getting the Terminology Right
For better or worse, modern SE doctrine focuses on the intent of the treaty makers to
answer questions about the domestic allocation of authority over treaty implementation. Treaties
rarely answer those questions. The discrepancy between judicial doctrine and the practice of
treaty negotiators has spawned the fictitious intent problem. Treaty makers can avoid the
fictitious intent problem by expressing their intentions clearly in the form of unilateral conditions
included in the U.S. instrument of ratification. Happily, the treaty makers have begun to do so by
adopting declarations specifying that a particular treaty is SE or NSE. 161 Unfortunately, political
branch explanations of those declarations have been inconsistent. Those explanations have
vacillated among the congressional-executive concept, the federal-state concept, and the
political-judicial concept. The President and Senate should agree on clear definitions of terms
and apply those terms consistently in accordance with agreed definitions.
The treaty makers should define the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” in
accordance with the congressional-executive concept. Under this definition, an SE treaty
provides a rule of conduct for federal executive officials, but an NSE treaty is not law for the
executive branch unless it is implemented by Congress. The treaty makers should use different
terminology to express the federal-state concept and the political-judicial concept. Using the
terms “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” to refer to all three concepts without
distinguishing among them does not serve any legitimate purpose. Of course, consistent usage of
terms in accordance with the political-judicial concept, as recommended by the ALI
Reporters, 162 would also promote greater clarity. Nevertheless, there are several reasons to favor
the congressional-executive definition over the political-judicial definition.
First, the proposed definition is consistent with the dominant concept of self-execution
that prevailed from the Founding until World War II. The federal-state concept was not invented
until after 1945. The most important sources of authority on SE doctrine before 1945 were
legislative and executive materials, not judicial materials. 163 Most legislative and executive
authorities use the SE/NSE terminology in accordance with the congressional-executive concept,
not the political-judicial concept. 164
Second, the proposed definition is consistent with most Supreme Court authority. Part III
of the Court’s opinion in Medellín v. Texas indisputably applied the congressional-executive
concept, not the political-judicial concept. 165 Granted, other portions of the Court’s opinion can
reasonably be construed in accordance with the federal-state concept or the political-judicial
concept, but that merely shows that the Court did not consistently apply a single SE concept
161
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throughout the opinion. The key passage from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Foster v.
Neilson is ambiguous, but the best interpretation of that passage is consistent with the
congressional-executive concept. 166 Other leading Supreme Court opinions on self-execution—
including Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp.,167 Cook v. United States, 168
Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 169 and Whitney v. Robertson 170—apply the
congressional-executive concept, not the political-judicial concept.
Third, the proposed definition is consistent with the most significant political branch
practice in the past decade. In September 2008, about six months after the Supreme Court
decided Medellín, the Senate provided its advice and consent for 78 treaties in four days. 171
Careful analysis of the Senate record demonstrates that the Senate understood the terms SE and
NSE in accordance with the congressional-executive concept, not the political-judicial
concept. 172
If the treaty makers want to say that a treaty is not supreme over state law, they can adopt
a declaration that the treaty does not supersede conflicting state laws. 173 Here, one must
distinguish between the concepts of “supremacy” and “preemption.” If a treaty is “supreme” over
state law, the treaty supersedes conflicting state laws, but states may enact laws that do not
conflict with the treaty. In contrast, if a treaty “preempts” state law, states are barred from
enacting regulations in the field “occupied” by the treaty, even if those regulations do not
conflict with the treaty. 174 In framing unilateral declarations, the treaty makers should distinguish
clearly among the concepts of self-execution, supremacy, and preemption. Declarations that a
treaty does not supersede conflicting state laws should be used infrequently because such
declarations, in Madison’s terms, would put the head “under the direction of the members.”175
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Cases where the political branches make a conscious choice to subordinate the national interest
in treaty compliance to the discretion of the fifty states will arise rarely, if at all.
If the treaty makers want a treaty to be enforceable by federal executive officials, but they
want to limit private judicial enforcement, they can adopt a declaration that the treaty is “selfexecuting,” but it does not “create a private cause of action,” or it does not “confer private rights
enforceable in U.S. courts.” Indeed, the treaty makers have adopted several such declarations in
recent years. 176 Here again, the terminology is important. If a treaty does not “create a private
cause of action,” civil plaintiffs may not invoke the treaty offensively, but civil and criminal
defendants may invoke the treaty as the basis for a defense. 177 If a treaty does not “confer private
rights enforceable in U.S. courts,” then private litigants are barred from invoking the treaty either
offensively or defensively, but the federal government can sue to enforce the treaty. 178 In
practice, the treaty makers have used the phrase “does not confer private rights” primarily for
treaties that are not intended to benefit private parties. To clarify this point, the treaty makers
should express the idea that a treaty “does not confer private rights” in the form of an
“understanding,” rather than a “declaration.” An “understanding” is an interpretive statement
designed to clarify the international meaning of the treaty. In contrast, a “declaration” is a
unilateral statement that can be used to control the domestic application of the treaty without
modifying the international obligation. 179
Finally, the treaty makers should avoid using the term “not judicially enforceable.” The
ALI Discussion Draft uses similar terminology, 180 but that terminology is problematic. If the
goal is to limit private judicial enforcement, the terminology discussed in the preceding
paragraph is preferable, because it preserves the option of a suit by the federal government to
enforce the treaty. If the treaty makers want to say that federal executive officials lack authority
to implement the treaty until Congress enacts implementing legislation, a declaration that the
treaty is “not self-executing” is appropriate. However, there does not appear to be any valid
reason for adopting the position that federal executive officials are authorized to implement the
treaty (self-executing), but they may not file suit to enforce the treaty (not judicially
enforceable). Indeed, I am not aware of any case where the treaty makers have endorsed this
position. Moreover, a declaration that a treaty is “not judicially enforceable” would raise difficult
constitutional issues because it implies that the treaty makers can use their Article II power to
order state and federal courts to refrain from applying supreme federal law. That position is
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difficult to reconcile with the principle of judicial independence, and with entrenched Supreme
Court doctrine protecting the due process rights of criminal defendants. 181
B. Recommendations for the Courts: Getting the Presumptions Right
The ALI Discussion Draft says: “The case law has not established a presumption for or
against self-execution, in the sense of a clear statement or default rule . . . .” 182 However, if one
discriminates among different concepts of self-execution, it becomes apparent that wellestablished legal principles support different presumptions in different contexts. First, and most
importantly, courts should adopt a presumption that the treaty makers did not have any intention
regarding self-execution, unless they expressed their intention clearly. Or, to state the point
differently, courts should adopt a presumption that self-execution is not a treaty interpretation
question, unless the treaty makers adopted explicit language addressing self-execution in the
treaty text or in the U.S. instrument of ratification. This presumption would bring judicial
decision-making in line with the actual practice of the government officials who negotiate and
ratify treaties. The presumption is necessary to remedy the fictitious intent problem, which is the
central problem with modern SE doctrine. In accordance with this presumption, courts should
resort to default rules unless the treaty makers adopt explicit language addressing self-execution
in the treaty text or in the instrument of ratification. The appropriate default rule depends on
whether the issue presented involves the congressional-executive concept, the federal-state
concept, or the political-judicial concept.
Begin with the federal-state concept. As noted above, it is important to distinguish
between “supremacy” and “preemption.” Absent an explicit declaration (or treaty text) to the
contrary, courts should presume that a treaty supersedes conflicting state law (a presumption in
favor of supremacy), but it does not preempt non-conflicting state law (a presumption against
preemption). The presumption against preemption is justified by the fact that courts apply a
presumption against preemption in the statutory context.183 In contrast, the presumption in favor
of supremacy is justified by the text and original understanding of the Supremacy Clause. 184
Moreover, the policy considerations that persuaded the Founders to adopt the treaty supremacy
rule—fears that actions by state and local officers could trigger a breach of U.S. treaty
obligations, contrary to the wishes of the federal political branches—also support a presumption
in favor of treaty supremacy. In short, the presumption in favor of treaty supremacy is necessary
to tame Madison’s monster: to ensure that the authority of the nation is not subordinate to the
authority of its constituent parts.
Consider, next, the congressional-executive concept. The Discussion Draft’s “no
presumption” rule makes sense as applied to the constitutional doctrine. If a court asks whether a
treaty is constitutionally SE or constitutionally NSE, the relevant authorities do not support a
presumption either way. However, if courts are applying a one-step approach (as in the intent
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doctrine), the appropriate presumption depends upon the relationship between the treaty and
federal statutes. If the treaty conflicts with a prior federal statute, the presumption against
implied repeals—which the Court has applied in numerous cases involving conflicts between
treaties and statutes 185—effectively creates a presumption in favor of non-self-execution.
However, if the treaty does not conflict with a prior federal statute, the President’s duty to
execute treaties, rooted in the Take Care Clause, establishes a presumption in favor of selfexecution. 186 Either presumption should be rebuttable if the treaty makers adopt a clear statement
in the treaty text or in the instrument of ratification. In accordance with the recommended
terminology, the clear statement should use the language of “self-execution.”
Next, consider the political-judicial concept. In this context, courts should distinguish the
question whether a treaty creates a private right of action from other questions related to judicial
enforcement. Here, the presumption against implied rights of action under federal statutes
supports a presumption against private rights of action under treaties. 187 That presumption should
be rebuttable if the treaty makers adopt a clear statement in the treaty text or in the instrument of
ratification. To avoid ambiguity, the treaty makers should use the term “private right of action,”
not the term “self-executing,” to overcome the presumption.
For other questions related to judicial enforcement, 188 courts should apply a two-step
approach, not a one-step approach (unless there is explicit language in the treaty text or the
instrument of ratification addressing judicial enforcement in domestic courts). As noted
previously, the justiciability doctrine combines the two-step approach with the political-judicial
concept. 189 In accordance with justiciability doctrine, courts should apply a treaty interpretation
analysis to ascertain the content and scope of the international obligation (step one). Then, in
step two, courts should apply a domestic separation-of-powers analysis to determine whether the
judicial branch is competent to enforce the specific treaty obligation at issue. For step two (the
judicial competence question), the Discussion Draft’s recommended “no presumption” rule is
appropriate. Courts must answer that question on a case-by-case basis. If the analysis in step two
yields a conclusion that courts are competent to enforce the treaty, the relevant authorities
support judicial enforcement. As the Supreme Court said recently, “once a case or controversy
properly comes before a court, judges are bound by federal law.” 190 A treaty is federal law,
unless the treaty is unconstitutional, or it has been superseded by a later-in-time statute, or the
treaty makers have exercised their Article II power to opt out of the treaty supremacy rule. The
principle that judges “are bound by federal law” means that they are bound by a treaty that has
the status of federal law, if the particular treaty provision at issue is within the scope of judicial
185
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competence. In such circumstances, courts should not invoke a fictitious “intent of the treaty
makers” to evade their duty to decide cases in accordance with federal law.
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